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I. INTRODUCTION
About ten years have passed since the onset of the so-called
sovereign debt crisis and the turbulence that marked the European
Monetary Union (“EMU”). EMU stability still appears uncertain
despite the laudable efforts made, above all, by the European Central
Bank (“ECB”) to prevent irreparable damage to the EMU and the
agreement reached in August 2015 over the third Greek bailout;
thereby avoiding Grexit and its potentially disastrous spill-over
effects.
While a general reform of the economic and constitutional
foundations of the European Union is advocated for many reasons,
certainly the current EMU legal framework needs more than a fine
tuning. As a matter of fact, in an effort to safeguard the monetary
union, and with it the European Union, the overall consistency of the
system has suffered from legal contrivance (bending of the rules) that
has weakened the very principles of the rule of law on which the
Union’s legal system has been built over decades.1 This has led to
1. See Gunnar Beck, The Court of Justice, the Bundesverfassungsgericht and
Legal Reasoning During the Euro Crisis: The Rule of Law as a Fair-Weather
Phenomenon, 3 EUR. PUB. L. 539 (2014) (extrapolating how issues pertaining to
EU institutions, the European Central Bank in particular, make these institutions
out of step with EU treaties); Armin von Bogdandy & Michael Ioannidis, Systemic
Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What It Is, What Has Been Done, What Can Be
Done, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 59, 59 (2014) (arguing that EU Member States
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tensions across European institutions, Member States, and EU and
national courts.
Part II of this article tries to explain why the EMU legal
framework has inherent defects and why they have passed unnoticed
for many years.2 Part III analyses the main judgments pronounced by
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) during the EMU crisis.3 Critical
aspects of these judgments are emphasised together with a plausible
“political” rationale underpinning them. Part IV assesses the EMU
and the Euro Crisis from the national high courts’ viewpoints and
considers the implications that such domestic case-law may have had
on the decisions adopted by the respective Member States’
governments in trying to rescue or stabilise the EMU.4 Part V
provides an analysis of the confrontation between the ECJ and the
German Constitutional Court concerning the ECB’s Outright
Monetary Transactions (“OMT”). This confrontation recently
concluded with the latter court surrendering to the ECJ’s position yet
claiming a non-persuasive, intrusive role of the judiciary in the fineline, dividing economic and monetary policies and competences in
the EU legal system.5
This article will not discuss all the steps in the Euro Crisis6 and the
are unable to uphold the rule of law due to corruption, weak institutions, and
insufficient resources, further weakening compliance with EU standards). See
generally ALPHEN AN DEN RIJN, THE ECLIPSE OF THE LEGALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Bresselink F. Pennings & S. Prechal eds., 2011) (expounding
on how the principle of legality, which protects citizens from the arbitrary use of
power, is being jeopardized in the European Union).
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. See discussion infra Part III.
4. See discussion infra Part IV.
5. See discussion infra Part V.
6. Mauro A. Megliani, Verso una Nuova Architettura Finanziaria Europea:
Un Percorso Accidentato, DIRITTO DEL COM. INT’L, 67 (2013); see Alexandre de
Streel, The Evolution of the EU Economic Governance Since the Treaty of
Maastricht: An Unfinished Task, 20 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & COMP. L. 336, 336
(2013) (reviewing how the Economic and Monetary Union developed in response
to the Euro Crisis); Gian L. Tosato, L’Integrazione Europea ai Tempi della Crisi
dell’Euro, 95 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INT’L 681 (2012); Annamaria Viterbo & Roberto
Cisotta, La Crisi Del Debito Sovrano e gli Interventi dell’U.E.: Dai Primi
Strumenti Finanziari al Fiscal Compact, 17 IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUR. 323
(2012)(providing a reflection on the EU monetary crisis, and the possible systemic
issues that may emerge as a result). See generally GIULIO PERONI, LA CRISI
DELL’EURO: LIMITI E RIMEDI DELL’UNIONE ECONOMICA E MONETARIA (2012).
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medium-term measures adopted from the so-called ‘Six Pack’7 to the
adoption of the Fiscal Compact and the European Stability
Mechanism (“ESM”).8 The article will also refrain from addressing
7. Council Regulation 1174/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 8, 9 (EU) (advocating for
supplementation of the multilateral surveillance procedure); Council Regulation
1175/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 12, 13 (EU) (requiring the Commission to have a
stronger role in surveillance procedure); Council Regulation 1176/2011, 2011 O.J.
(L 306) 25, 25 (EU); Council Regulation 1177/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 33, 33
(EU); Council Directive 2011/85/EU, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 41, 41 (EU). See generally
Council Directive 1173/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 1 (EU) (requiring a medium-term
budgetary objective of all Member States utilizing the Euro).
8. Christian Calliess, From Fiscal Compact to Fiscal Union? New Rules for
the Eurozone, in 14 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. OF EUR. LEGAL STUD. 101, 101 (Catherine
Barnard et al. eds., 2012); Tim Middleton, Not Bailing Out . . . Legal Aspects of
the 2010 Sovereign Debt Crisis, in A MAN FOR ALL TREATIES: LIBER AMICORUM
EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS 421, 422 (Bruylant ed., 2012) (explaining
the origin of the European Financial Stability Facility); C.A. Stephanou, Building
Firewalls: European Responses to the Sovereign Debt Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL
DEBT: ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, MONETARY, POLITICAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS
127, 127 (Hieronymi & Stephanou eds., 2013); Roberto Baratta, Legal Issues of
the ‘Fiscal Compact’- Searching for a Mature Democratic Governance of the
Euro, IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUR. 647 (2012); Leonard Besselink & Jan H.
Reestman, The Fiscal Compact and the European Constitutions: ‘Europe Speaking
German’, 8 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012); Christian Calliess & Christopher
Schoenfleisch, Auf dem Weg in die Europäische “Fiskalunion”? – Europa – und
Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen einer Reform der Wirtschafts – und Währungsunion
im Kontext des Fiskalvertrages, 67 JURISTENZEITUNG 477, 481 (2012); Giacinto d.
Cananea, L’Ordinamento Giuridico dell’Unione Europea dopo I Nuovi Accordi
Intergovernativi, 67 COMUNITA INT’L 1, 3 (2012); Carlo M. Cantore & Giuseppe
Martinico, Asymmetry or Dis-integration? A Few Considerations on the ‘New
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary
Union’, 19 EUR. PUB. L. 463 (2013); Giuseppe Cogliandro, L’impatto del Fiscal
compact sul sistema di governance europea, LUISS 337 (2013); Paul Craig, The
Stability, Coordination, and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and
Pragmatism, 37 EUR. L. REV. 231, 231 (2012); Enrique B. Crespo & Stuart
Holland, Resolving the Eurozone Crisis and Enhancing Global Governance, 67
COMUNITA INT’L 13 (2012); Editorial Comments: Some Thoughts Concerning the
Draft Treaty on a Reinforced Economic Union, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1, 2
(2012); Ledina Gocaj & Sophie Meunier, Time Will Tell: the EFSF, the ESM, and
the Euro Crisis, 35 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 239, 239 (2013); Azoulai Kocharov,
Monster? An EUI Debate on the Fiscal Compact Treaty, EUR. U. INST. 1, 1 (2012);
Alberto de Gregorio Merino, Legal Developments in the Economic and Monetary
Union During the Debt Crisis: The Mechanisms of Financial Assistance, 49
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1613, 1613 (2012); Christoph Ohler, The European
Stability Mechanism: The Long Road to Financial Stability in the Euro Area, 54
GER. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 47 (2012); Matthias Ruffert, The European Debt Crisis and
European Union Law, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1777, 1777 (2011); Alexandre de
Streel & Judicaël Etienne, Le Traité sur la Stabilité, la Coordination et la
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the limits to the ECB’s responsibilities or on the legitimacy of
initiatives that in recent years and months it has adopted, for any
comment on whether the ECB has correctly enforced the powers and
mission assigned to it by the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) and, in particular Article 127, which has
been open to diverging interpretations, would be outside the scope of
this work.9
My aim here is to highlight the above referred bending of rules
and the response of case law. In this way, I will suggest how such
contrivances may condition possible paths to reform and the destiny
of the EMU in a context of unchanged legislation.

II. THE VAGUE FORMULAS OF THE
EMU PROVISIONS
A. WHY NO ADEQUATE LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EMU RULES
WAS DONE DURING THE ‘GOOD OLD DAYS’ PRECEDING THE EURO
CRISIS
Any analysis of the economic governance of the European Union
must start with a qualitative assessment of the rules contained in the
TFEU with particular emphasis on those that determined the
European Monetary Union.
As jurists, perhaps, we thought that since we were talking about
rules aimed at regulating predominantly economic processes and,
more precisely, macroeconomic ones, our job was essentially to
describe or, better still, to narrate. After all, these rules seemed
connected to extremely technical (and political) issues about which
we were probably ill-equipped to do what is normally expected of us,
which is to read the norms rather than necessarily write them. The
objective of our work should be, then, to regulate not only events in
Gouvernance au Sein de l’Union Economique et Monétaire, 20 J. DE DROIT EUR.
182 (2012); Jean-Claude Zarka, Le Traité Sur la Stabilité, la Coordination et la
Gouvernance dans l’Union Économique et Monétaire, in RECUEIL DALLOZ, 893
(2012). See generally Jean-Victor Louis, The Unexpected Revision of the Lisbon
Treaty and the Establishment of a European Stability Mechanism, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON 284 (Nicola Countouris et al.
eds., 2012).
9. Fabio Bassan, Le Operazioni non Convenzionali della BCE al Vaglio della
Corte Costituzionale Tedesca, 97 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INT’L 361, 361 (2014).
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the past but, above all, those in the present and future on the basis of
an analysis of foreseeable scenarios, i.e., on the basis of the possible
interpretations and applications available.
So, whilst nearly all the rules of the EU’s legal system were put
under the microscope, legal analysis on economic and monetary
issues appeared more superficial.10 This approach also applied to
core constitutional aspects of the Union, such as the workings of the
EMU, the relation between exclusive EU competences established in
TFEU Article 3(c) and the coordination of economic policy
responsibilities set out in TFEU Article 5(1) as well as the powers
assigned to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).11
Even more serious was the lack of any critical analysis as to the
existence of possible solutions – let alone appropriate ones – in the
event of system criticalities. First and foremost, as a result, the
illusion that the Euro was totally immune to risks and that
membership was the gateway to advantages for all spread from
Member States down to their citizens. This included the reduction in
interest rate charges on public debt, the possibility of acquiring
goods and services at better conditions, and the abolition of price
instability.12 Second, evident economic and monetary shortcomings
10. Hugo J. Hahn, The Stability Pact for European Monetary Union:
Compliance with Deficit Limit as a Constant Legal Duty, 35 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 77, 78 (1998); Matthias J. Herdegen, Price Stability and Budgetary Restraints
in the Economic and Monetary Union: The Law as Guardian of Economic
Wisdom, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9, 10 (1998); Francis B. Jacobs, The European
Parliament and Economic and Monetary Union, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 361
(1991); Jean-Victor Louis, The Economic and Monetary Union: Law and
Institutions, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 575, 575 (2004); Jean-Victor Louis, A
Legal and Institutional Approach for Building a Monetary Union, 35 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 33, 73 (1998); Jörn Pipkorn, Legal Arrangements in the Treaty of
Maastricht for the Effectiveness of the Economic and Monetary Union, 31
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 263 (1994); Rene Smits, The European Constitution and
EMU: An Appraisal, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 425, 467 (2005); Antonio
Tizzano, Qualche Considerazione sull’Unione Economica e Monetaria, 2 Il
DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUR. 455 (1997). See generally Luigi Daniele, Unione
Economica e Monetaria, Obblighi Degli Stati Membri e Poteri Sanzionatori delle
Istituzioni, IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUR. 931 (1996).
11. Protocol (No. 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 7, 30 [hereinafter Protocol No.
4].
12. But see European Banking Federation, The Euro Area Will Not be Immune
to the Global Slowdown, 24 EBF ECON. OUTLOOK, 1, 2, 4 (2007), http://www.ebf-
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in the treaties were put down to teething problems already
experienced at the launch of the European Union. What was
important, as previous events in the history of European integration
had shown, was to lay the normative foundations – though
incomplete – to enable the system to develop; refinement would
occur pragmatically, as usual in such matters, thanks to the help of
the Court of Justice.13 Even when the first cracks started to appear, it
seemed sufficient to define the rules in question as “stupid,” the term
then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi,
famously used to describe the rules contained in the Stability and
Growth Pact (Articles 1466/97 and 1467/97).14
The fact that rigorous legal analysis unearthed severe problems
with the subject matter was already shown in the first significant
dispute referred to the Court of Justice - the Stability Pact Decision
of 2004.15 The court struggled to handle, within a legal framework,
fbe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Outlook_n24-2007-02342-01-E.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 13, 2017) (predicting the decline of the euro in world markets).
13. Corrado Caruso & Marta Morvillo, Economic Governance and Budgetary
Rules in the European Context: A Call for a New European Constitutionalism, 19
IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUR. 699 (2014); Maria Francesca Cucchiara, Fiscal
Compact e Meccanismo Europeo di Stabilità: quale impatto sull’equilibrio
istituzionale dell’Unione?, 20 IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUR. 91 (2015); Filippo
Donati, Crisi dell’Euro, Governance Economica e Democrazia nell’Unione
Europea, 18 IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUR. 337 (2013); Maria L. Tufano & Sara
Pugliese, Il Nuovo Strumento di Convergenza e Competitività: Verso una
“Governance” negoziata per l’UEM?, 19 IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUR. 317
(2014); Lucia S. Rossi, “Fiscal Compact” e Trattato sul Meccanismo di
Stabilità:Aaspetti Istituzionali e Conseguenze dell’Integrazione Differenziata
nell’UE, IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUR. 293 (2012).
14. See Council Regulation 1466/97, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 1 (EC); Council
Regulation 1467/97, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 1 (EC).
15. See Case C-27/04, Comm’n v. Council, 2004 E.C.R. I-6679 (deciding not
to adopt the recommendation of the Commission to allow an excessive debt
procedure against France and Germany); P. Diman & M. Salerno, Sentenza Ecofin:
gli equilibri della Corte tra tensioni politiche, Costituzione economica europea e
soluzioni procedurali, in DIR. PUB. COMP. EUR. 1842 (2004); Dimitrios Doukas,
The Frailty of the Stability and Growth Pact and the European Court of Justice:
Much Ado About Nothing?, 32 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 293, 293
(2005); Tomas de la Quadra-Salcedo Janini, La discrecionalidad política del
ECOFIN en la aplicación del procedimiento por déficit excesivo. Reflexiones tras
la Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de 13 de julio de 2004, REVISTA DE STUD.
POL. 151, 151 (2004); Ramon T. Macau, Cómo gobernar aquello que se
desconoce?: El caso de la Comunidad Europea en Tanto que Unión Económica y
Monetaria, 9 REVISTA DE DERECHO COMUNITARIO EUR. 47, 47 (2005); Imelda
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what was an essentially political issue; deciding to suspend an
excessive deficit procedure against two key Member States,
Germany and France, thereby distancing itself from the
recommendations the Commission had adopted in applying the rules
mentioned above.16

B. THE EURO CRISIS AND THE SUDDEN AWARENESS OF EMU
RULES’ FLAWS
By the end of last decade, the jurists’ ingenuous reliance on the
economic foundations forming the EMU backbone disappeared all of
a sudden; the 2007 crisis demonstrated that the dogma of the EMU as
a system built to withstand any external pressure suffered from an
inherent error in design or in forecasting. We jurists found ourselves
unprepared to deal with this situation. Only then did we understand
the inadequacy of the normative framework, together with the
unprecedented puzzle it created at the European law level, incapable
of setting priorities between conflicting economic objectives. For
example, the incompatibility of the buzzwords “rigour” on the one
hand and “growth” on the other, and even greater incapability to
provide answers of any kind to face market pressures and
speculation, both of which were actually flourishing because of the
absence of a precise system of rules.
Spurred by the urgency to react at all costs and often in only a few
hours, rules were produced that can only be termed as embarrassing
in their improvisation. An emblematic case was the European
Financial Stability Fund (“EFSF”), a limited company agreed to by
the 17 Eurozone Member States at the time and incorporated in
Luxembourg under Luxembourg law in June 2010. Capitalised in the
course of a few days with around 190 billion euros, the Fund’s aim
was to provide financial support to Greece, Portugal, and Ireland by
issuing long-term bonds.17 The legal basis of this solution and other
Maher, Economic Policy Coordination and the European Court: Excessive Deficits
and ECOFIN Discretion, 29 EUR. L. REV. 831, 831 (2004).
16. Case C-27/04, Comm’n v. Council, at 6680.
17. See Frequently Asked Questions on the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM), EUR. STABILITY MECHANISM 3 (July 28, 2014) [hereinafter ESM FAQ],
https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/faqontheesm.pdf (providing that the
ESM replaced the EFSF on July 1, 2013, and that its exclusive surviving aim is to
manage the financial facilities granted to Greece, Portugal, and Ireland and receive
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temporary measures adopted at the time was found in TFEU Article
122(2), a provision actually envisaged to provide financial help to
cope with natural disasters or exceptional circumstances, i.e., events
that seem very different from those the temporary measures were
designed for.18
Later, Member States and European institutions developed betterthought-out and more stable rules that managed to avert the derailing
of the EMU.19 Nevertheless, a definitive judgement on them has to be
postponed for a variety of reasons; primarily because their adoption
went largely beyond the bounds of the EU’s constitutional system.
The Fiscal Compact and the ESM both lie outside the Treaty on
European Union (TEU) and the TFEU, and establish an
“international agreement” parallel to the EU legal system whose
overall coherence must be entirely tested.20 Sadly enough, this
decision was mandated because of the strong opposition by the
British government to modify the EU Treaties and hence relevant
EMU provisions. De facto, it may work as a legal poison pill for the
uncertainties it brings in the overall functioning and interpretation of
the European economic and monetary system. After Brexit, this
poison pill may taste even bitterer.

C. WEAK RULES FOR UNCLEAR POLICIES?
This said, the content of these provisions appears ‘immature’ as
rule of law, at least considering the behaviour of the states, but also
of the European institutions themselves, after their adoption.
Repeatedly, requests are done at a political level to modify or
repayments).
18. See Phoebus Athanassiou, Of Past Measures and Future Plans for
Europe’s Exit From the Sovereign Debt Crisis: What is Legally Possible (and
What is Not), 36 EUR. L. REV. 558, 565 (2011) (discussing objections to the use of
Article 122(2) as the basis of the EFSM).
19. See supra note 8, and infra note 30, (referencing to the Fiscal Compact
and the ESM Treaties, as well as regulations quoted).
20. See Paul Craig, Pringle and Use of EU Institutions Outside the EU Legal
Framework: Foundations, Procedure and Substance, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 263,
266, 268-69 (2013) [hereinafter, Craig, Pringle and Use of EU Institutions]; Steve
Peers, Towards a New Form of EU Law?: The Use of EU Institutions Outside the
EU Legal Framework, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 37, 45 (2013); Stéphane Pinon,
Crise Économique Européenne et Crise Institutionnelle à Tous les Étages, 567
REV. DE L’UNION EUR. 218 (2013).
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reinterpret these rules, this implying a call for renegotiation of their
overall contents. This hypothesis is garnering support in an
increasing number of Member States and European institutions, both
from those advocating more flexibility in the apparently stringent
regime provided for to avoid excessive deficits and government
debts of Member States, and for those claiming for more rigour in
their budgetary discipline.21
Further cause for suspending judgment on the rules adopted in the
aftermath of the Euro Crisis lies in the uncertain effects this new
constitutional architecture of the EU and EMU will have. One need
only think that, as a result of the ESM Treaty, Italy, which has a
stake of just over 17% of the capital, is committed to underwriting
shares equivalent to a paid-in capital contribution to the ESM of
more than 125 billion euros.22 What is more, in order to maintain a
high rating, the ESM established the rule that it will invest only in
high-rated, high-quality, and highly-liquid securities.23 The outcome
for Italy is that, through the ESM, it ends up financing less-indebted
economies (those commonly referred to as more virtuous) with its
own public debt. We can discuss whether this is the right price to pay
to have a state bailout fund, but a certain ‘cross sightedness’ of the
rules emerging cannot be ignored.
Meanwhile, after almost six years, the draconian obligation
established by Article 4 of the Fiscal Compact onto Member States,
whose government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60%
reference value, has remained practically unapplied to reduce debt at
an average rate of one twentieth per year.24
21. Ingolf Pernice, What Future(s) of Democratic Governance in Europe:
Learning From the Crisis, in CHALLENGES OF MULTI-TIER GOVERNANCE IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION EFFECTIVENESS, EFFICIENCY AND LEGITIMACY 12, 25 (2012)
(claiming that the existing structures are unable to “achieve . . . economic
governance in the EU . . . [but] [c]lear preferences were expressed for unity”).
22. Briefing: European Stability Mechanism (ESM): Main Features,
Instruments and Accountability, EUR. STABILITY MECHANISM, 9 (Jan. 17, 2017)
[hereinafter ESM Briefing], http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes
/note/join/2014/497755/IPOL- ECON_NT(2014)497755_EN.pdf.
23. Id. (“The ESM operates conservative capital and liquidity management
policies to ensure that there is no shortfall of liquid assets to service ESM’s own
obligations, even if a borrower defaults. The paid-in capital cannot be used in
lending operations but has to be invested (together with the reserves) in highquality and liquid securities.”).
24. See Government Finance Statistics- Quarterly Data, EUROSTAT 3 (Jan. 23,
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Moreover, in the past months the situation seems to have further
evolved and the newly established EMU rules underwent functional
or even ‘liberal’ interpretations: For instance, it remains unlikely that
Greece will be able to reimburse the EU institutions for the loans
granted under its three bailouts. In June 2016, ECB announced that
Greece may re-use its bonds as collateral in Euro-system monetary
policy operations, and hence borrow further money from the ECB.25
In July 2016 the European Commission recommended the Council
(Member States’ governments) to cancel fines and to set new fiscal
paths for Spain and Portugal even if they are in breach of the
Stability and Growth Pact (the set of rules designed to ensure that
countries in the EU pursue sound public finances and coordinate
their fiscal policies)26 and should therefore be sanctioned with fines
up to 0.2% of their respective GDP according to TFEU Article
126(8).27
These new developments are certainly linked to Brexit and the
need to avoid any further turmoil in European financial markets. And
yet, a mid-term, clear direction for European economic and financial
policy seems far from being envisaged.
Last, but not least, there are still no details of the rules concerning
any possible ‘plan B’ to be applied in the event last-ditch efforts fail
to save the euro-zone membership of some states. The irreversibility
of membership to the euro is a position which, though insistently
repeated, appears no longer unequivocal or even particularly
persuasive, especially when some states insist on keeping their
national currencies and yet continue to be full members of the
European Union. The dogma of irreversibility is even less
convincing if we consider that, in the weeks leading up to Greece’s
third bail out, informal remedies to allow Grexit seemed plausible
2017) [hereinafter Government Finance Statistics], http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Government_finance_statistics-quarterly
data#Governmentfinancialbalancesheet (claiming that at the end of the third
quarter of 2016 the government debt to GDP ratio reached 90.1%).
25. European Central Bank Press Release, ECB Reinstates Waiver Affecting
the Eligibility of Greek Bonds Used as Collateral in Eurosystem Monetary Policy
Operations (June 22, 2016) [hereinafter ECB Press Release].
26. See supra notes 3 & 8.
27. See European Commission Press Release IP/16/2625, Stability and Growth
Pact: Fiscal Proposals for Spain and Portugal (July 27, 2016) [hereinafter European
Commission Press Release].
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and potentially available from the legal point of view.
Politically it is understandable, justifiable, and indeed appropriate
that any ‘plan B’ should not be regulated by law; as past events have
shown, this would trigger speculation and political, economic, and
financial opportunism. The following initiatives by Member States
and European institutions focusing above all on bolstering the EMU
are therefore to be applauded. At the legal level examples include, in
addition to the ESM and Fiscal Compact, the European Securities
and Markets Authority (ESMA)28 and banking union,29 and,
28. See Council Regulation 1095/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 84 (EU); see also
Pedro G. Teixeira, The Regulation of the European Financial Market After the
Crisis, in EUROPE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 9 (Pompeo Della Posta & Leila
Simona Talani eds., 2011); Takis Tridimas, Financial Supervision and Agency
Power, in FROM SINGLE MARKET TO ECONOMIC UNION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF
JOHN A. USHER 55, 65-67 (Niamh Nic Shuibhne & Laurence W. Gormley eds.,
2012); Mads Andenas & Iris H. Y. Chiu, Financial Stability and Legal Integration
in Financial Regulation, 38 EUR. L. REV. 335, 339 (2013); Niamh Moloney, EU
Financial Market Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis: “More Europe” or
More Risks?, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1317, 1332 (2010) [hereinafter Moloney,
EU Financial Market Regulation]; Niamh Moloney, Reform or Revolution: The
Financial Crisis, EU Financial Markets Law, and the European Securities and
Markets Authority, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 521, 523 (2011) [hereinafter Moloney,
Reform and Revolution]; Pierre Schammo, The European Securities and Markets
Authority: Lifting the Veil on the Allocation of Powers, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1879, 1879 (2011).
29. See Council Regulation 1024/2013, art. 6(1), 2013 O.J. (L 287) 63 (EU)
(establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism); Council Regulation 806/2014,
art.1, 2014 O.J. (L 225) 1 (EU) (establishing the Single Resolution Mechanism);
see also Council Regulation 2015/81, 2014 O.J. (L 15) 1 (EU); Jens Dammann,
The Banking Union: Flawed by Design, 45 GEO. J. OF INT’L L. 1057, 1060-62
(2014); Antonio Di Marco, Il Controllo delle Banche nell’EUM: la (Problematica)
Nascita di un Sistema Integrato di Vigilanza Prudenziale, 3 IL DIRITTO
DELL’UNIONE EUR. 549 (2013); Rosa M. Lastra, Banking Union and Single
Market: Conflict or Companionship?, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1190, 1192-93
(2013); Niamh Moloney, European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and
Resilience, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1609, 1614-25 (2014); Gianni Lo Schiavo,
From National Banking Supervision to a Centralized Model of Prudential
Supervision in Europe?: The Stability Function of the Single Supervisory
Mechanism, 21 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 110, 111 (2014); Laura Wissink,
Ton Duijkersloot & Rob Widdershoven, Shifts in Competences Between Member
States and the EU in the New Supervisory System for Credit Institutions and their
Consequences for Judicial Protection, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 92, 92 (2014);
Andreas Witte, The Application of National Banking Supervision Law by the ECB:
Three Parallel Modes of Executing EU Law?, 21 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L.
89, 95-96 (2014); Benedikt Wolfers & Thomas Voland, Level the Playing Field:
The New Supervision of Credit Institutions by the European Central Bank, 51
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operationally the ECB’s OMT and quantitative easing programmes.30
Nevertheless, on the basis of what can be seen, the modus
operandi is unusual and – at a purely legal level – the system leaves
too many unresolved questions. In the absence of norms or
procedures regulating the departure of a Member State from the
EMU this would inevitably create the basis for fiscal union with real
integration of economic policy and a collective debt redemption
fund, at least in part, that consequently overcomes the ‘no bail out
clause’ established by TFEU Article 125.31 These solutions are all
legally conceivable, but politically controversial.
Yet, the result of this attempt to keep any option available with no
clear solutions in sight eventually reveals alarming cracks in the
EU’s legal architecture. This situation will be the focus of the next
sections.

III. THE ECJ TESTING THE EMU RULES
A. THE EMERGENCY JUDGMENT REQUESTED FROM THE ECJ IN
THE PRINGLE CASE AND THE APPARENT CLASH BETWEEN THE
EMU AND ESM
In the preceding paragraphs I have tried to draw attention to the
qualitative inadequacy of economic and monetary rules contained in
the EU and TFEU treaties, the limits of the rules rushed-out during
the Euro Crisis, and the scarce room for manoeuvring of Member
State representatives in terms of their political mandate.
Not surprisingly then, the first time these rules were referred to the
ECJ, in Pringle, the court’s decision raised some concerns.32 In
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1463, 1466-1468 (2014).
30. See infra Part II.
31. See Rainer Palmstorfer, To Bail Out or Not to Bail Out? The Current
Framework of Financial Assistance for Euro Area Member States Measured
Against the Requirements of EU Primary Law, 37 EUR. L. REV. 771, 775-76
(2012); see also Jean-Victor Louis, The No-Bailout Clause and Rescue Packages:
The Guest Editorial, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 971, 976-77 (2010).
32. Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland; see Pieralberto Mengozzi, Il Trattato sul
Meccanismo di Stabilità (MES) e la Pronuncia della Corte di Giustizia nel Caso
Pringle, STUDI SULL’INTEGRAZIONE EUROPEA 129 (2013); see also Stanislas
Adam & Francisco Javier Mena Parras, The European Stability Mechanism
Through the Legal Meanderings of the Union’s Constitutionalism: Comment on
Pringle, 38 EUR. L. REV. 848, 848 (2013); Vestert Borger, The ESM and the
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particular, alongside a certain relief for a judgment that confirmed
the legitimacy of the normative instruments designed to save the
EMU and perhaps the European Union itself, the legal pressure the
court was under to reach this result did not go unnoticed.
The first concern arising from the Pringle judgment relates to the
question of competence. The ECJ was asked to determine whether
the new TFEU Article 136(3)33 went beyond monetary policy alone
and the coordination of Member State economic policy but instead
represented an amendment to the competences in monetary and
economic policy arising from giving Member States the possibility to
grant financial assistance in ways other than those foreseen by the
same TFEU (essentially in addition to the, albeit inadequate,
provisions of TFEU Article 122 or Article 143 for non-EMU
Members).34 If this were the case, the provision would, however, not
only have affected TFEU Part 3 but also Part 1 in violation of rules
regarding modifications to the treaties: TFEU Article 136 was
integrated using the simplified treaty revision procedure established
by Article 48(6) implementing the provisions of the TEU regarding
simplified revisions contained in Article 48(6), first and second
paragraphs TEU, which expressly permits modifications affecting
European Court’s Predicament in Pringle, 14 GERMAN L.J. 113, 113 (2013); Paul
Craig, Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology, 20 MAASTRICHT J.
EUR. & COMP. L. 3, 7 (2013) [hereinafter Craig, Pringle: Legal Reasoning];
Edoardo Gambaro & Francesco Mazzochi, Le Regole dell’Unione Europea alla
Prova della Crisi dei Debiti Sovrani: Il Caso Pringle, 2 DIRITTO COMMERCIALE
INTERNAZIONALE 545, 545 (2013); Pieter-Augustijn Van Malleghem, Pringle: A
Paradigm Shift in the European Union’s Monetary Constitution, 14 GERMAN L.J.
141, 142 (2013); Martin Nettesheim, Europarechtskonformität des Europäischen
Stabilitätsmechanismus, 66 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 14, 14 (2013);
Daniel Thym & Mattias Wendel, Préserver le Respect du Droit dans la Crise: la
Cour de Justice, le MES et le Mythe du Déclin de la Communauté de Droit, 3
CAHIERS DE DROIT EUR. 733, 733 (2012); Bruno de Witte & Thomas Beukers, The
Court of Justice Approves the Creation of the European Stability Mechanism
Outside the EU Legal Order: Pringle, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 805, 806 (2013).
33. Council Decision 2011/199/EU of 25 March 2011 Amending article 136 of
the Treat on the Functioning of the European Union with Regard to a Stability
Mechanism for Member States Whose Currency is in the Euro, art. 1, 2011 O.J.
(C91) 1 (adopting Article 136.3 of the TFEU).
34. Id. (providing that “The Member States whose currency is the euro may
establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the
stability of the euro area as a whole and stating that the granting of any required
financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict
conditionality.”).
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solely the provisions of TFEU Part 3.
The court rejected the applicant’s argument as follows: “[H]aving
regard to Articles 4(1) TEU and 5(2) TEU, the Member States whose
currency is the euro are entitled to conclude an agreement between
themselves for the establishment of a stability mechanism,”35
implicitly excluding the idea that the ESM was the particular stability
mechanism foreseen by TFEU Article 136(3). Indeed, the ECJ was
adamant in assessing that the ESM is extraneous to the EMU, hence
depriving the new drafting of TFEU Article 136 of any relevance as
if this provision were inserted fortuitously.
The consequences for the court after reaching such a conclusion
were significant, forcing it to develop a line of reasoning that was not
particularly convincing36 above all with regards to the general
question of Member States’ external competences and particularly to
the possibility of their concluding extra-EU agreements on matters
regulated by EU law.37 Admittedly, the ESM Treaty was signed
exclusively by EU Member States. However, this has little relevance
given that, in order to protect EU law vis-à-vis international
agreements (inter-state included), in Pringle the ECJ drew attention
to the duty of Member States to respect EU law when carrying out
their respective competences by mentioning the Elisa Gottardo case,
which however concerned a treaty signed with a non-EU Member
35. Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, ¶ 68.
36. See Roberto Cisotta, Fiscal Discipline, the EU Financial Stability and
Solidarity in Times of Crisis: Some Reconstructive Cues, 1 IL DIRITTO
DELL’UNIONE EUR. 57, 72 (2015) (stating that the court’s solution in Pringle is
“legitimised” by a normative vacuum related to the safeguarding of financial
stability in the euro area as a whole, and by the fact that, in this subject matter, the
flexibility clause provided for by TFEU Article 352 cannot apply). It may be
correct as an ex post conclusion, but I believe the court has stretched EU law a
little bit too much.
37. See Alberto Malatesta, C. Ricci, External Relations of the European
Community on Monetary Matters, IL DIRITTO DEL L’UNIONE EUR., 229 (2002)
(discussing EU external relations concerning economic and monetary policy); see
also Roberto Basso, On External Relations of the European Community in Matters
Relating to Economic and Monetary Union, 84 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INT’L. 111, 111
(2001); Christoph W. Herrmann, Monetary Sovereignty over the Euro and
External Relations of the Euro Area: Competences, Procedures and Practice, 7
EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 1, 1–24 (2002); Norbert Weinrichter, The World
Monetary System and External Relations of the EMU: Fasten Your Safety Belts!, 4
EUR. INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 10, 10 (2000).
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State.38
Hence, to protect the ESM from being judged a violation of EU
competences, in Pringle the court was forced to allow Member
States to sign international agreements that overlap EU competences
but are external to the Union provided that the obligations deriving
from these agreements respect EU law.39 This undoubtedly is a step
backwards with regards to the supposed parallelism of internal and
external competences first established in ERTA which later became
an integral part of EU primary law as illustrated by TFEU Article
3(1) and ad abundantiam, TFEU Article 216.40
The ESM’s independence vis-à-vis those stability mechanisms,
nevertheless foreseen by TFEU Article 136(3), forced the court to
perform other acrobatics in reasoning, this time on the subject of
whether the involvement expressly established in the ESM Treaty of
Union Institutions in fact meant an increase in the Union’s
competences or in those of its institutions.41 This widening of
competences could not have been achieved by the new TFEU Article
136(3) because this provision had been enacted pursuant to the
simplified treaty revision procedure which can only be used for
amendments to Part 3 of the TFEU.42
Here the court’s response is even more elliptical, being based
essentially on the idea that, as the ESM is outside EMU rules, the
contents of the ESM Treaty, also vis-à-vis the involvement of EU
institutions, do not modify their competences.
Alas, the court preferred not to base its legal reasoning on the
premise that the ESM is basically an agreement that derives, in some
way, from TFEU Article 136 and is subject to it. If it had though, this
approach would certainly have required a more detailed analysis in
the area of international law and perhaps some further legal
38. Case C-55/00, Gottardo v. INPS, 2002 ECR I-413, ¶ 32.
39. See Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland,
¶ 69 (noting that strict
conditionality under Paragraph 3 of TFEU Article 136 is used to ensure that that
mechanism will operate in a way that will comply with European Union law,
including the measures adopted by the Union in the context of the coordination of
the Member States’ economic policies).
40. Case 22/70, Comm’n v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263.
41. See Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, ¶ 71.
42. Treaty on European Union, art. 48, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C191) 1
[hereinafter EU Treaty].

2017]

THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION

361

acrobatics on whether the ESM represented a modification of some
competences. It would have, in some way, reined in the ESM within
the Union’s constitutional framework. Such an approach would also
have more effectively confirmed the centrality of the framework over
the ESM. It would also have offered an authoritative proposal as to
how the ESM’s system could in the future be incorporated within the
EMU. I believe this solution is the most appropriate for recompacting the EU’s constitutional architecture, especially upon
Brexit’s conclusion (i.e. when the fiercest opponent to the insertion
of the ESM within the EU treaties will no longer be in the Union).
Taking further into account that, as we have already seen and will
see, the “horizontal” and “parallel” approach instead of the ESM and
EMU raises significant doubts, for instance, when the court assumes
that the ESM does not exclude measures of financial assistance
inside the EU system, based on TFEU Article 122.43 As one stability
mechanism is more than enough, such a hypothesis appears
somewhat unrealistic.
Similarly unconvincing is the part of the judgment where the
court, though having to recognise the significant points of contact
between the ESM and EMU, attempts to settle the question simply
by stating that “the ESM will, among other tasks, assume the tasks
allocated temporarily to the EFSM” (i.e. an instrument of temporary
financial support established with the precise aim of implementing
TFEU Article 122(2)).44
In brief, the court identifies two parallel worlds, one inside the
EMU the other outside it, both compatible and able to coexist
without having to modify Union competences or those of the
Member States. Furthermore, in Pringle the ESM would be
consistent with EU rules, as Member States cannot contract
obligations that contrast with these rules.
Personally, such a line of reasoning appears flawed. It seems
difficult to assume that two interchangeable instruments can coexist
without the working of one affecting the working of the other. This,
however, as we will now see, is also the conclusion reached by the
43. Case 22/70, Comm’n v. Council, ¶ 103 (noting “that fact is not such as to
affect common rules of the Union or alter their scope”).
44. Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, ¶ 103.
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court in the Gauweiler judgment.45

B. THE CONDITIONALITY PRINCIPLE AS A PREREQUISITE TO
IMPLEMENT ECONOMIC POLICY MEASURES OR MONETARY POLICY
CHOICES
The parallel worlds generated by the coexistence of the ESM with
EMU rules and instruments also produces problems concerning the
ESM’s impact on rules established at the EU level to coordinate
economic policy.
On this point, the ECJ declared that “the ESM is not concerned
with the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States,
but rather constitutes a financing mechanism,” in this way, rejecting
the view that through the ESM the areas of competence existing
amongst Member States and between them and the Union had
changed.46 The court’s reasoning is still less convincing when it
regards the conditionality the Member State using the financial
assistance is subject to and the impact this conditionality has on the
beneficiary’s economic policy; an impact the court terms “indirect
consequences.”47 In fact, economic policy measures are imposed on
states by the principle of conditionality, whose application
presupposes financial assistance. Strictly speaking, we are talking
here of imposition rather than coordination. However, the TFEU
rules on economic policy coordination imply certain discretional
powers on the part of Member States, thus offering them some room
for manoeuvre in terms of sovereignty48 which is far greater than that
offered to states applying for financial assistance.49
In fact, leaving aside questions of the system’s democratic deficit,
it is clear to all, especially to Euro-zone Members, that the rules on
economic policy coordination, those of the EMU, have tended to be
applied as long as the situation is physiological. When a Member
State, however, has to ask for a form of financial assistance, it leaves
45. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, 2015 E.C.R. 400.
46. Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, ¶ 110.
47. Id. ¶ 97.
48. See supra note 16 & 17 and accompanying text.
49. See Michael Ioannidis, EU Financial Assistance Conditionality After TwoPack, 74 ZAÖRV 61, 100 (2014) (discussing the topic of conditionality).
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the world of the EMU to enter that of the ESM, triggering
conditionality mechanisms that radically reduce the country’s
sovereignty.50 According to the court, all this conforms to the treaties
because the ESM is distinct from the EMU despite the existence of
TFEU Article 136(3) that foresees exactly the same tie between
financial assistance and conditionality. This must implicitly remain a
dead letter, even though formally it can happily coexist with the
EMS, because otherwise its operation would alter the structure of
intra-EMU competences, an outcome not allowed for by treaty
reform mechanisms.
The limits of this line of reasoning become clear when we
consider that financial assistance via the ESM is just one of a range
of options available and is used to help a Member State in difficulty.
One has only to think of the ECB’s commanding role in shoring up
the situation caused by the Greek crisis. However, in the court’s
reasoning, this role loses its sense of being complementary and
fundamental instrumental in crisis management becoming simply an
instrument of monetary policy which almost by chance has effects in
other areas as well.
In fact, in Gauweiler the court had to address the very same
‘indirect consequences’ that implementation of the OMT programme
might (or should) have on the economic policies of beneficiary states
resulting from the purchase of their sovereign bonds on secondary
markets by the ECB, in particular as this programme “may,
indirectly, increase the impetus to comply with those adjustment
programmes and thus, to some extent, further the economic-policy
objectives of those programmes.”51 Once again, the court held that all
this does not change the nature or confines of the ESCB’s
competence, which remains restricted to monetary policy.52
Yet, with all the goodwill and understanding that we owe a judge
faced with the task of providing solutions distinctly outside the
sphere of law, the rule-bending carried out by the ECJ is apparent.
Luckily, at least between the lines, I believe that in Gauweiler the
court tried to anchor its reasoning to some principle of EU law, i.e.,
50. The European Stability Mechanism, EUR. CENTRAL BANK (July 2011),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/art2_mb201107en_pp71-84en.pdf.
51. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, ¶ 400.
52. Id. ¶¶ 58-68.
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the principle of loyal cooperation amongst institutions (here, the ECJ
and the ECB). The court uses this principle to confirm the tenet of
the ESCB’s absolute autonomy: this enables it to avoid entering into
a legal review concerning decisions that are essentially technical and
discretionary – the OMT programme – for the purposes of assessing
whether these decisions go beyond the confines of the competences
attributed to the ESCB or to the ECB. Indeed, as we will see,
Gauweiler has the undoubted merit of re-establishing a basis of legal
principles concerning the interpretation and application of
programmatic rules such as those relating to the EMU, thereby
defusing attacks aimed at delegitimising the ECB and, as a result, at
weakening the European legal system overall vis-à-vis alleged
constraints stemming from the need to safeguard the prerogatives of
Member States.

C. THE CHAMELEONIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC
POLICY AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE ECJ RECENT CASE LAW:
A GOOD-BYE TO THE RULE OF LAW PRINCIPLE WITHIN THE EU
LEGAL SYSTEM?
The court’s legal reasoning suffered further bending, in particular
on the question of the reach of monetary policy. In its attempt to
scale down the ESM and upstream the amended TFEU Article 136,
the court in Pringle marked out the scope and objectives of monetary
policy exclusively in terms of price stability.53 Unequivocal in this
sense are, amongst others, paragraphs 56-57 of the judgment, in
which the ECJ states that the ESM’s objective was “to safeguard the
stability of the euro area as a whole, that is clearly distinct from the
objective of maintaining price stability, which is the primary
objective of the Union’s monetary policy.”54 The court continued by
saying that,
[e]ven though the stability of the euro area may have repercussions on the
stability of the currency used within that area, an economic policy
measure cannot be treated as equivalent to a monetary policy measure for
the sole reason that it may have indirect effects on the stability of the

53. Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland.
54. Id. ¶ 56.
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euro.55

Along these lines, the court specifies in paragraph 57 that “[t]he
grant of financial assistance to a Member State however clearly does
not fall within monetary policy.”56
This reasoning is excessively schematic given that economic
policy and monetary policy are far more interrelated than the court
wants to admit. In fact, the ECB is in no way extraneous to the ESM:
in the first place, because it was requested to state an opinion on the
compatibility of TFEU amended Article 136 with Article 125 before
the adoption of decision 199/2011.57 Secondly, because the ECB is
55. Id.
56. Id. ¶ 57; see also id. ¶ 136 ( “[A]s is apparent from paragraph 5 of the ECB
opinion on the draft European Council Decision amending Article 136 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability
mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro, the activation of
financial assistance by means of a stability mechanism such as the ESM is not
compatible with Article 125 TFEU unless it is indispensable for the safeguarding
of the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and subject to strict
conditions.”).
57. Jürgen Bast, Don’t Act Beyond Your Powers: The Perils and Pitfalls of the
German Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires Review, 15 GERMAN L.J. 167 (2014);
Thomas Beukers, The Bundesverfassungsgericht Preliminary Reference on the
OMT Program: “In the ECB We Do Not Trust. What About You?”, 15 GERMAN
L.J. 341 (2014); Editorial, An Unintended Side-effect of Draghi’s Bazooka: An
Opportunity to Establish a More Balanced Relationship Between the ECJ and
Member States’ Highest Courts, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 375 (2014)
[hereinafter An Unintended Side-effect of Draghi’s Bazooka]; Udo Di Fabio,
Karlsruhe Makes a Referral, 15 GERMAN L.J. 107 (2014); Klaus Ferdinand
Gärditz, Beyond Symbolism: Towards a Constitutional Actio Popularis in EU
Affairs? A Commentary on the OMT Decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Court, 15 GERMAN L.J. 183 (2014); Carsten Gerner-Beuerle et al., Law Meets
Economics in the German Federal Constitutional Court: Outright Monetary
Transactions on Trial, 15 GERMAN L.J. 281 (2014); Matthias Goldmann,
Adjudicating Economics? Central Bank Independence and the Appropriate
Standard of Judicial Review, 15 GERMAN L.J. 265 (2014); Mattias Kumm, Rebel
Without a Good Cause: Karlsruhe’s Misguided Attempt to Draw the CJEU into a
Game of “Chicken” and What the CJEU Might Do About It, 15 GERMAN L.J. 203
(2014); Franz Mayer, Rebels Without a Cause? A Critical Analysis of the German
Constitutional Court’s OMT Reference, 15 GERMAN L.J. 111 (2014); Dietrich
Murswiek, ECB, ECJ, Democracy, and the Federal Constitutional Court: Notes on
the Federal Constitutional Court’s Referral Order from 14 January 2014, 15
GERMAN L.J. 147 (2014); Ingolf Pernice, A Difficult Partnership Between Courts:
The First Preliminary Reference by The German Federal Constitutional Court to
the CJEU, 21 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 3 (2014); Niels Petersen,
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mentioned as one of the (main) actors within the ESM treaty. From
this perspective it also becomes more difficult to base an argument in
terms of the confines of the ECB’s powers because, if the solution
provided by the court in Pringle makes sense in terms of saving the
institutional and inter-state solutions made necessary by the
emergency, the precedent is offered up to the German Constitutional
Court in its request for a preliminary ruling in Gauweiler 58 on the
legality of the OMT under EU law precisely starting from the basis
of the ECJ’s restrictive interpretation of monetary policy given in
Pringle.
On this point and above all ex post, perhaps this particular cloud
had one silver lining given that in Gauweiler, and in marked
opposition to the arguments raised by the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht, the court declared, on the question of the
ESCB’s competences and the objectives of monetary policy, that
“[w]ithout prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB
shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view
to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.”59
Admittedly, there is nothing new here as the wording tracks that of
TFEU Article 127. Moreover, it is right that the ESCB’s hands are
not tied solely to price stability, as probably some proponents of their
own national central-bank model would prefer.
Nonetheless, it is a fact that from this perspective the competences
of the ESCB and the EMS do tend to overlap and that consequently
Karlsruhe Not Only Barks, but Finally Bites—Some Remarks on the OMT Decision
of the German Constitutional Court, 15 GERMAN L.J. 321 (2014); Asteris Pliakos,
et al., Blind Date Between Familiar Strangers: The German Constitutional Court
Goes Luxembourg!, 15 GERMAN L.J. 369 (2014); Dagmar Schiek, The German
Federal Constitutional Court’s Ruling on Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
– Another Step Towards National Closure?, 15 GERMAN L.J. 329 (2014); Karsten
Schneider, Questions and Answers: Karlsruhe’s Referral for a Preliminary Ruling
to the Court of Justice of the European Union, 15 GERMAN L.J. 217 (2014);
Alexander Thiele, Friendly or Unfriendly Act? The “Historic” Referral of the
Constitutional Court to the ECJ Regarding the ECB’s OMT Program, 15 GERMAN
L.J. 241 (2014); see infra Part IV.
58. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, ¶ 43.
59. Roberto Cisotta, Disciplina Fiscale, Stabilità Finanziaria e Solidarietà
nell’Unione Europea ai Tempi della Crisi: Alcuni Spunti Rcostruttivi,IL DIRITTO
DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA 57 (2015) (offering a more generous interpretation of
Pringle).
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the interpretations of the rules offered in Pringle appear to have
served exclusively for contingencies.60 At the end of the day, the
court put realpolitik before the rule of law.
The same realpolitik can be seen also in Gauweiler: Having
ascertained that both the OMT programme and the activities of the
ESM consist in the purchase of government bonds on the secondary
market and that these purchases are subordinate to a programme of
macroeconomic adjustment, the court rejected the idea that the OMT
programme can be regarded in any way as a measure extraneous to
monetary policy, simply specifying that,
the difference between the objectives of the ESM and those of the ESCB
is decisive[;] whilst . . . a programme such as that at issue in the main
proceedings may be implemented only in so far as is necessary for the
maintenance of price stability, the ESM’s intervention is intended to
safeguard the stability of the euro area, that objective not falling within
monetary policy.61

So, once the ESCB, in carrying out its powers “independently”
and “without any political pressure,” has identified price stability as
the objective of its actions, this suffices, in the court’s opinion, to
block any legal dispute regarding the question of attributed
competences.62 Once more it is worth signalling the descriptive intent
in this part of the judgment, clearly influenced by the strong
(political) debate about the limits characterizing ECB powers and
prerogatives. As we will fortunately see, in Gauweiler the court’s
reasoning appears slightly more organic and complete and is
grounded on general principles of law typically used in legal
reasoning. The overall result, therefore, is without doubt more
convincing.

D. THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM AND THE TENSIONS IT
CREATES ON EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Another problem here to be highlighted, though relating only to
the Pringle judgement, is nevertheless symptomatic of the climate
generated by the euro crisis and its effects on the Union. The final
60. See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, ¶ 64 (discussing objectives of the ESCB and
EMS).
61. Id.
62. Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, ¶ 180.
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part of the judgment confirms that the governance systems put in
place outside the confines of the Union are not subject to any
controls regarding their compatibility with the fundamental rights
established by the Charter because
the Member States are not implementing Union law, within the meaning
of Article 51(1) of the Charter, when they establish a stability mechanism
such as the ESM where . . . the EU and FEU Treaties do not confer any
specific competence on the Union to establish such a mechanism.63

The argument is apparently impeccable and logically follows from
the ratio decidendi of the judgement. However, once again it fails to
persuade because, as the ESM and EMU by definition have to work
together,64 it is difficult to imagine that Member States and
institutions which, when in an EMU setting adopt economic or
monetary policy measures are expected to abide by the Charter, and
may fail to do so when the same or similar measures are adopted in
an EMS setting, perhaps as part of a specific bail-out plan for one
Member State, as was the case in the Greek crisis.
In this sense, though correctly arguing as to the non-application of
the Charter, the Court perplexingly omitted to mention even the
possibility, as a minimum in theory, that the EMS system should at
least conform to the principles of fundamental rights and freedom
that have emerged from the constitutional traditions shared by
Member States.
Such an omission cannot be fortuitous. Certainly, reference, had it
been there, to the common constitutional traditions and, a fortiori, to
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) would have
evoked and perhaps brought new life to article 6.3 TEU (a provision
which lost most of its utility after the coming into force of the Treaty
of Lisbon and the formal recognition of the Charter as primary EU
law),65 so dismissing the idea that the ESM lies somehow outside the
EU and FEU Treaties. If the Court had wanted to, it certainly could
have developed lines of reasoning similar to those, which from the
63. See supra Part II, § A.
64. See Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Fransson, 2013 E.C.R. 105.
65. See generally Ornella Porchia, Il Ruolo della Corte di Giustizia
dell’Unione europea nella Governance Economica Europea, in CRISIS Y
COORDINACIÓN DE POLÍTICAS ECONÓMICAS EN LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 593 (Marcial
Pons ed., 2013).
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1970s onwards, progressively integrated fundamental human rights
into European law. Therefore, it is realistic to claim that the Court
deliberately decided not to express itself on these issues. Why? There
are two possible explanations: the first could be out of a form of selfrestraint on the part of the Court towards a question that is
unprecedented and potentially disruptive to the system of EU law,
perhaps preferring to wait for a later and less controversial
opportunity to return to the question. In fact, the Court has still to
express itself on the rules of economic governance and perhaps also
offer an analysis that takes into account principles or fundamental
rights.66
The second explanation, which is less optimistic and more
problematical, lies in the possibility that the Court had already
absorbed – in line with indications provided by the doctrine and
some national courts67 – the inconsistency of these new instruments
of financial assistance with some fundamental individual rights.
In particular, this last point is of considerable interest to jurists
since it shows how the application of measures designed to safeguard
the euro are starting to create problems for the common
constitutional values within Member States and upon which the
Union should be founded, according to the preamble and article 2 of
the EU Treaty, and the principle of the rule of law that we jurists in
Europe have been accustomed to for decades.
Here it should be added that, also after Pringle, despite repeated
requests, the ECJ has declined to address the impact the ‘indirect
consequences’ of financial assistance measures adopted as part of the
new European instruments will have on fundamental rights and
individual freedom. Two cases in point are Sindicato dos Bancàrios
do Norte and Sindacato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e
Afins, where the Court correctly declared the claims as inadmissible,
66. See Baratta, supra note 8, at 673 (elaborating on perspicuous remarks);
Massimo Starita, Il Consiglio Europeo e la Crisi del Debito Sovrano, 96 RIVISTA
DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 385 (2013); see also supra Part III, § B (providing a
short outline of the Member States’ courts view on the relationship between EMU
measures and fundamental rights).
67. Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte v. Banco Português de
Negócios SA, 2013 E.C.R. 149; Case C-264/12, Sindicato Nacional dos
Professionais de Seguros e Afins v. Fidelidade Mundial—Companhia de Seguros
SA, 2014 E.C.R. 2036.

370

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:2

opted not to consider the issue, and preferred to state technically
valid though arid solutions that ultimately provide no opinion obiter
dictum or otherwise.68 In the light of this, the self-restraint
explanation mentioned above appears even less convincing.
Fortunately, signs of some support on the level of fundamental
individual rights appears to have been provided recently by other
institutions, while the Court more recently has envisaged some
apparent remedies, that are not however quite persuasive. I will
shortly touch upon them in the Conclusions.

IV. MEMBER STATES’ HIGH COURTS IN THE
FACE OF THE EMU
A. THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT APPROACH . . .
It is useful at this stage to understand whether, in these turbulent
years, there are other players on the scene. In this regard, I believe
that a significant addition to the problems in discussing European
economic governance has come from Germany’s Constitutional
Court. In fact, since the notable Lissabon-Urteil judgement of 30th
June 2009, establishing from the German constitutional legal
viewpoint the conditions under which Germany could ratify the
Treaty of Lisbon,69 the Bundesverfassungsgericht (“BVG”) has
established the existence of inherent limitations in the German
Grundgesetz that hinder further forms of European integration.
Several years on, we can now track the course developed by the
BVG: keeping abreast of the times, it has managed to place several
domestic constitutional hurdles in the way of European integration,
thereby limiting the bargaining and political power of the Union’s
most powerful Member (Germany). This solution has been obtained
68. BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 2/08, June 30, 2009,
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html (Ger.); see Luis
Miguel Poiares Maduro & Giorgio Grasso, Quale Europa dopo la sentenza della
Corte Costituzionale tedesca sul Trattato di Lisbona?, 1 IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE
EUR. 503 (2009) (providing an exhaustive analysis of the Lissabon-Urteil); see
also Enzo Cannizzaro & M. Eugenia Bartoloni, Continuità, discontinuità e
catastrofismo. Sulle reazioni della dottrina al Lissabon-Urteil, 1 IL DIRITTO
DELL’UNIONE EUR. 15 (2010) (analyzing the analysis of German courts on the
Lisbon Treaty).
69. BRUNO NASCIMBENE, COSTA/ENEL: CORTE COSTITUZIONALE E CORTE DI
GIUSTIZIA A CONFRONTO, CINQUANT’ANNI DOPO (2015).
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through a significant revival of the theories of “counter-limits,” that
had flourished in the seventies as a legacy elaborated in particular by
the German and Italian constitutional courts;70 such theories had
appeared destined to be consigned to the history books of European
integration, since the more recent obstacles to further integration had
come from the political sphere or in the form of referendums, thereby
excluding any technical or legal reasoning.71
In 2009, the sovereign debt crisis had yet to explode but already
the BVG saw perhaps more than many others the cracks that were
appearing in the EMU and set about erecting defences around the
German legal system.
In the Lissabon-Urteil, the Court established in a fully-rounded
way the workings of the so-called Einzelermächtigungen, i.e. a
reading of the principle of conferral from the point of view of
Member States’ legal systems and Germany’s in particular: as
competences are ‘conferred,’ the Union cannot increase them
without violating the sovereignty of Member States and their
constitutional systems; if the Union wishes to increase these
competences, it must ask for specific measures to attribute power to
modify them on a case-by-case basis.72
The effects on the EU legal system are evident as they impact the
flexibility clause (article 352 TFEU), severely limiting its application
potential. And this is why, for instance, two years after the LissabonUrteil, the Union – or more precisely, its Member States – were
forced to change the treaties by amending article 136 TFEU, a norm
that provided significant application potential if one reads the
argumentation the ECJ was forced to develop in Pringle.73
Moreover, the mechanisms that test the constitutionality of
German laws repeatedly provide the BVG with the opportunity to lay
down the conditions to its government and parliament and
consequently to EU institutions,74 primarily to the European Council
70. Id. (making reference to the 2005 French and Dutch referendums that had
doomed the so-called treaty establishing a constitution for Europe).
71. BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 2/08, part II. § a (Ger.).
72. Id. ¶¶ 105-08.
73. Klaus Ferdinand Garditz, Beyond Symbolism: Towards a Constitutional
Actio Popularis in EU Affairs? A Commentary on the OMT Decision of the
Federal Constitutional Court, 15 GERMAN L.J. 183, 184-85 (2014).
74. BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 1390/12, Sept. 12, 2012,
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and Council. Particularly, within the Verfassungsbeschwerde the
BVG can clarify and strengthen domestic constitutional limits vis-àvis the adoption of all the main State bail-out measures coming from
both inside and outside the EU system, from the Greek bail-out to the
ESM Treaty.75 Such a constitutional complaint procedure can be
activated (and has been activated in literally thousand of cases,
almost all declared inadmissible) by citizens, scholars, organisations
and even political parties, including the left socialist party die Linke,
whose repeated complaints to the BVG reveal a strong opposition
against financial assistance to Southern Europe countries affecting
German citizens’ economy, and display another example of
decreasing international solidarity also by traditionally socialist
parties, whose defence of the weak persons apparently end at the
national borders.
In this way, thanks to the assertion of the principle of democracy,
protected by the Grundgesetz, and consequently of the sovereignty of
the German people and their representatives (i.e. the Bundestag), the
BVG intends to maintain control over the main budgetary decisions,
and to exert considerable constitutional influence over intergovernmental methods and over the possibility of modifying treaties
to establish instruments designed to reform economic governance
within the EU. In fact, once excluded the German government’s
power to introduce bail-out mechanisms that are not ratified by the
Bundestag, or better, that have not been decided by it, any German
statute willing to give legal force to agreements reached inside or
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20120912_2bvr139012.html (Ger.) (describing
the Greek bail-out); BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 987/10, Sept. 7,
2010,
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20110907_2bvr098710.html
(Ger.);
Christian Calliess, The Future of the Eurozone and the Role of the German
Constitutional Court, DEP’T EUR. L. STUD. 1, 8-12 (2012) (describing the EMS
Treaty); Jared Curzan, Comment, A Critical Linkage: The Role of German
Constitutional Law in the European Economic Crisis and the Future of the
Eurozone, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1543, 1556 (2012); Susanne Schmidt, A Sense
of Déjà Vu? The FCC’s Preliminary European Stability Mechanism Verdict, 14
GERMAN L.J. 1, 6-7 (2013); Mattias Wendel, Judicial Restraint and the Return to
Openness: The Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the EMS
and the Fiscal Treaty of 12 September 2012, 14 GERMAN L.J. 21, 33-6 (2012);
Karsten Schneider, Yes, but . . . One More Thing: Karlsruhe’s Ruling on the
European Stability Mechanism, 14 GERMAN L.J. 45, 60-61 (2013).
75. BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 2/08, June 30, 2009,
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html (Ger.).
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outside EU law, and capable of introducing open-end mechanisms to
provide financial assistance to States, becomes subject to an
assessment of constitutional legitimacy by the BVG, since the
economic and financial effects of these mechanisms on the German
system end up to be always subject to parliamentary approval.76
Therefore, the BVG’s consent to the German government and
State both on the question of financial assistance to Greece in 2012
and on Germany’s capitalisation of the ESM, though at first judged
positively, in reality appears to limit possible broader-based
solutions. In fact, the domestic constitutional constraint posed by the
BVG reduces the range of available solutions that Member States’
governments (among which the German one) may envisage as
necessary to address the current incompleteness both of the EMU
and of the EU, and resolve the contradictions of the system described
above. Indeed, apart from the obvious domestic political pressure
exerted by BVG case law, the legal limits of this Court’s decisions
on the German government in European negotiations and on the
Union as a whole are clear.
And what is more, given that in general the search for
parliamentary consent on international issues can be exploited for
domestic political ends, this indirectly but significantly weakens
Member States’ institutions and the “Community method” adopted in
76. See Andrea De Petris, Un Rinvio Pregiudiziale Sotto Condizione?
L’Ordinanza del Tribunale Costituzionale Federale sulle Outright Monetary
Transactions, 4 FEDERALISMI.IT 4 (2014), http://www.federalismi.it/nv14/articolodocumento.cfm?artid=24220; see also Press Release, European Central Bank,
Tech. Features of Outright Monetary Transactions (Sept. 6, 2012),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf2012/html/is120906.en.html;
Mario
Draghi, President of the ECB, Introductory Statement to the Press conference with
Q&A
(Sept.
6,
2013),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/
html/is120906.en.html; Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Exec. Bd. of the EC, the
ECB & its OMT Programme, Speech at the Centre for Econ. Policy Research,
German Inst. for Econ. Research & KfW Bankengruppe Berlin (Sept. 2, 2013);
Carlo Altavilla et al., The Financial and Macroeconomic Effects of OMT
Announcements 4-5 (Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1707, 2014),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1707.pdf; Tolek Petch, The
Compatibility of Outright Monetary Transactions with EU Law, 7 L. & FIN. MARK.
REV. 13, 19 (2013); Philippine Cour-Thimann & Bernhard Winkler, The ECB’s
Non-standard Monetary Policy Measures the Role of Institutional Factors and
Financial Structure 12-13 (Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1528, 2013),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1528.pdf.
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Europe that has for decades represented the real difference between
the EU and other international organisations.
Therefore, it came as no surprise if the BVG’s first request for a
preliminary ruling by the ECJ on article 267 TFEU was assertively
and almost rhetorically worded, expressly indicating to the Court the
conditions under which the measures announced by the ECB as part
of the OMT programme were compatible with EU law.77 In actual
fact, the BVG was asking the Court to declare the OMT programme
incompatible with the Treaties, using for this purpose the weaknesses
present in Pringle, in particular with reference to the scope of
monetary policy—and so the very mission of the ECB—as set forth
in the TFEU.78
The distance between a European institution and the supreme
judge of one of the Member States is unprecedented in the history of
EU law. In some way, this conflict, let us say, breaches also the
principle of loyal cooperation established by article 4.3 TEU, a
principle that from the BVG’s point of view was perhaps in fact
breached by the ECB. And this approach probably wanted to mark a
new era of the dialogue between national judges and the ECJ as we
have known it for decades in the form of the reference for a
preliminary ruling.79
However, as we will see, the Court was in no way conditioned by
this method and if anything wanted to reaffirm, first, its exclusive
prerogative as interpreter of EU law and, second, the binding nature
of its decision on any national court.80 Such a stance has significant
consequences: the first and most immediate is the legitimisation of
the OMT programme under EU law. The Court however also
indicated the systematic control it intended to exercise on the
instruments chosen by the ECB to carry out its mandate;81 the second
and considerably more complicated outcome potentially concerned
77. BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 2/08, June 30, 2009,
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html (Ger.).
78. Thiele, supra note 57, at 246-47.
79. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, 2015 E.C.R. 400.
80. BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 2/08, June 30, 2009,
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html (Ger.).
81. See Kumm, supra note 57 (assuming that because of BVG’s rigidity on
these issues, Germany could be in breach of the EU law rules with the related
consequences).
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Germany, and its Constitutional Court, which after Gauweiler, had to
face the dilemma of, on one hand, respecting EU law as interpreted
by the ECJ’s preliminary rulings whilst, on the other, overcoming the
constitutional rigidity produced by its case law.82

B. THE RESPONSE BY THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN
EUROPEAN STATES’ HIGH COURTS
However, it is not only the BVG that is weakening Member States’
shared constitutional traditions. In fact, an interpretation of national
primary laws in support of a political stance grounded on rigour in
interpreting European decisions on financial assistance for Member
States in difficulty, runs up against an interpretation of the
constitutional laws of those States opposed to the application of
measures adopted by them in implementing the ‘strict conditionality’
required by financial assistance programmes.
So, whilst in Pringle the ECJ rejected the admission of
fundamental rights and individual freedom as a yardstick for the
legality of financial assistance measures, Greece’s Court of Audit
and Supreme Court judged the Greek government’s public spending
cuts unconstitutional.83 A few months later, Portugal’s Constitutional
Court declared that provisions contained in the 2013 Budget Law
passed by the Portuguese parliament once more as part of the
austerity measures made necessary by the ‘new normative
instruments’ adopted to save monetary union violated the principles
of equality and of fundamental social rights.84 Later, this Court
confirmed such judgment three more times.
82. Nomos (2012:4093) [Approval of the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy 20132016],
EFIMERIS
TIS
KIVERNISSEOS,
2012,
A:222
(Greece),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=99876 (issuing a
negative decision on the raising of the retirement age and on the cuts to pensions
and to the allowances provided to Greek retired workers. On 7 November 2012, the
Supreme Court declared cuts to Greek judges’ salaries unconstitutional. On 27
February 2013, again, the Court of Audit declared the rules retroactively adopted
by the Greek legislator to cut public salaries and wages unconstitutional.).
83. Roberto Cisotta & Daniele Gallo, Il Tribunale Costituzionale Portoghese, i
Risvolti Sociali Delle Misure di Austerità ed il Rispetto dei Vincoli Internazionali
ed Europei, 7 DIRITTI UMANI E DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 465 (2013).
84. Federico Fabbrini, The Euro-crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the
Political Process in Comparative Perspective, 32 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 64, 92
(2014).
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In this conflict between Courts and their respective founding
values, worthy of note are two judgements (numbers 223/2012 and
116/2013)85 of the Italian Constitutional Court, which declared
unconstitutional cuts to judges’ salaries carried out by the Berlusconi
government in 2010 and to ‘fat cat’ pensions decided by the Monti
government in the second half of 2011, i.e., at the height of
turbulence when the spread of Italian bond yields over comparable
German bunds ballooned to over 500 basis points.86 Although both
judgements, particularly the second, were seen by some as an
inappropriate defence of the unacceptable benefits of a privileged
few, here I would like to highlight how also the Italian Constitutional
Court revealed an evident conflict between, on one hand, the
application of austerity measures decided by Member States in an
EMU setting and the founding principles of the Italian constitution
on the other.87 The same Court’s judgement no. 70/2015 can be seen
in a similar vein: though basing its argument on the inadequacy of
the reasoning offered by the Italian legislator, the Court declared the
Italian government’s decision to block pension upgrades
unconstitutional despite the fact that the measure was taken as part of
cost containments required to meet euro-zone convergence
parameters “imposed” by the EU.88
85. Corte Cost., 8 ottobre 2012, n. 223, GIUR. IT. 2012, 1 (It.); Corte Cost., 3
giugno 2013, n. 116, GIUR. IT. 2012, 1, 9 (It.).
86. See Decreto Legge, 6 luglio 2011, n.98, G.U. July 6, 2011, n.155 (It.)
(referencing urgent provisions for financial stabilization); see also Decreto Legge,
15 luglio 2011, n.111, G.U. July 16, 2011, n.164 (It.); see also Decreto Legge, 6
dicembre 2011, n.201, G.U. Dec. 6, 2011, n.284 (It.) (referencing urgent provisions
for growth, fairness and consolidation of public finances).
87. See Paola Ivaldi, Diritto Dell’Unione Europea e Processo Costituzionale,
IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUR. 191 (2013); see also Allan Rosas, The National
Judge as EU Judge; Some Constitutional Observations, 67 SMU L. REV. 717
(2014); see also Christoph Grabenwarter, National Constitutional Law Relating to
the European Union, in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 83, 8586 (Armin von Bogandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2010); Antonio Tizzano, Ancora Sui
Rapporti tra Corti Europee: Principi Comunitari E c.d.Controlimiti Costituzionali,
IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUR. 734 (2007).
88. See Decreto Legge, n.201/2011, ¶ 25 (describing urgent provisions for
growth, fairness and consolidation of public finances); see also Legge, 22
dicembre 2011, n.214, G.U. Dec. 27, 2011, n.300 (It.) (referencing a statute which
was declared in breach of articles 3, 36 ¶ 1 and 38 of the Italian Constitution,
however, the Constitutional Court did not uphold the theories advocated by the
Italian referring judges; rather, the contested rules were considered further
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Fortunately, not all constitutional courts are antagonistic with
regards to EMU or ESM rules or more precisely with regards to the
implications these rules have at national level.89 In an overview of
the positions taken by national constitutional courts, the judgment of
the Estonian Supreme Court is significant. This Court was asked
whether the 85% majority foreseen within the ESM Board of
Governors was compatible with the Estonian constitution, on the
basis of the fact that only three Member States (Germany, France and
Italy) can exercise a veto, meaning that the other members have to
comply with the Board’s decisions.90
The Estonian Supreme Court had no hesitation in judging this rule
consistent with the principle of proportionality and therefore
legitimate even though it restricts the financial competence of the
Estonian parliament, the principle of rule of law and the sovereignty
of Estonia.91 Without overemphasizing the significance of this
judgment, it does nevertheless show that, at least on economic issues,
the most recent EU Member States – and their judges – believe in
European Monetary Union and in the “community” method perhaps
more than others.

V. THE LEGALITY OF THE OMT PROGRAMME
UNDER EMU RULES: A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE ECJ AND THE BVG
A. THE LIKELY STRUCTURE OF THE EMU LEGAL SYSTEM AFTER
THE GAUWEILER JUDGEMENT BY THE ECJ
Amongst the varying opinions on the constitutional effects
determined by the shortcomings of the EMU, the ECJ has had, at
least so far, the last word in Gauweiler. Clearly, the ECJ judgement92
was the product of a solely EU perspective. And admittedly, few
detrimental to fundamental rights as provided by the European Convention on
Human Rights).
89. See Cucchiara, supra note 13, at 110 (providing a short overview of the
internal constitutional case-law on ESM).
90. See Treaty Establishing the Europeans Stability Mechanism art. 4 ¶ 4, Feb.
2, 2012, Eur. Comm’n, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-12-3_en.htm.
91. Supreme Court of Estonia, Judgment No. 3-4-1-6-12 (July 12, 2012),
riigikohus.ee/?id=1347.
92. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, ¶ 9.
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doubted that the Court would have delegitimised the OMT
programme and, by doing so, sound the death knell of monetary
union.
However, apart from the outcome, a reading of the judgement
motivation suggests that the Court had no intention of obtaining a
minimum result, but instead bravely – and at least on the political
level persuasively – sought to offer a system-wide indication and at
the same time halt perhaps once and for all repeated attempts to
delegitimise and weaken the ECB, i.e. the institution that, over the
last few years, had more than any other taken on the task of saving
the euro and the EU against a backdrop of political (and has we have
seen, for some, also legal) paralysis characterised by the actions of
Member States.
The Court’s iter decidendi is not perfect, nor totally persuasive
when it attempts to create a continuum between its judgement and
Pringle. Also because, as I have already pointed out, it was by no
means easy to counter the BVG’s astute referrals on the basis of the
weaknesses inherent in the Pringle judgement.
The ECJ, however, clarified point by point the issues raised in the
referral, so providing a structured defence of the workings of the
ESCB, which can be summarised as follows.
First and foremost, a “strong” legal review of ESCB and ECB
measures is not allowed as these institutions enjoy absolute
autonomy and independence with regards to any form of political
pressure and consequently a considerable margin of discretion in
making technical decisions.93 The only limit they have in performing
their institutional mission concerns the motivations of the decisions
they take, which can be subject to judicial review where there is a
“manifest error of assessment.”94 On this question, a reading of ECB
93. Id. ¶ 40.
94. Id. ¶ 74; see id. ¶ 75 (implying that even more emblematic – and
symptomatic of the Court’s will to keenly reply to BVG is,
the fact, mentioned by the referring court, that that reasoned analysis
has been subject to challenge does not, in itself, suffice to call that
conclusion into question, since, given that questions of monetary
policy are usually of a controversial nature and in view of the
ESCB’s broad discretion, nothing more can be required of the ESCB
apart from that it use its economic expertise and the necessary
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documents regarding the transmission of monetary policy in the euro
area, made up by all “the various channels [and I include the OMT
programme as one of them] through which monetary policy actions
affect the economy and the level of prices in particular”95 will suffice
to show, also jurists, how difficult it is to interpret and categorise in a
rigid way (and in doing so, mistakenly) measures that are extremely
complex and variable. In this sense, the ECJ is to be commended for
those parts of the judgement motivation where, clarifying that the
objective of the OMT programme is to remedy instabilities in the
monetary policy transmission mechanism, it recognises that
assessments made by the ECB should be respected even though these
may concern selective measures that have indirect consequences on
the economic policy objectives established in parallel adjustment
programmes agreed on (or imposed) as part of the EFSF or ESM.96
Having made this clarification, the Court had little difficulty in
reaching further conclusions that strengthened the EMU and
consequently the Union as a whole. Above all, we have already seen
how the ECJ’s preference for an analysis of relevant treaty norms
that does not seek the rigid compartmentalisation of economic policy
and monetary policy measures implies also its preference for a more
flexible interpretation of the principle of conferred competences. It is
here, I believe, that the greatest divergence emerges between the ECJ
and the principles of conferral theorised by the BVG already seen in
the Lissabon-Urteil judgement. Indeed, in Gauweiler, the ECJ sought
to take this opportunity to stress, in contrast to the rigidity of the
German judgements, the need for and legal correctness of a flexible
approach vis-à-vis the interpretation of rules assigning powers to
institutions, particularly those of the ECB. Such flexibility is fully
consistent with the principle of loyal cooperation and presupposes
the need to allow the ECB to be able to assume the role and the
responsibility also institutional which, in the current critical situation,
the ECB itself has marked out.

technical means at its disposal to carry out that analysis with all care
and accuracy).
95. European Central Bank, Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area,
EUR. CENT. BANK MONTHLY BULL. 43 (July 2000).
96. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, ¶ 55.
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Furthermore, and once more in contrast with the BVG’s line of
reasoning, the ECJ clarified that the bond-purchase programmes
established for certain Member States and for categories of bonds
issued (such as the OMT programme) are already “circumscribed
and limited,” so making it unnecessary and indeed wrong to set “a
quantitative limit . . . prior to its implementation, such a limit being
likely, moreover, to reduce the programme’s effectiveness.”97
Obviously, we are a long way from the legitimisation of any openend measure, which puts the ECB’s independence and capacity to act
at risk and infringes therefore article 123 or article 125 TFEU.
Nevertheless, there is an unmistakeable similarity between the
Court’s judgement and Mario Draghi’s famous “whatever it takes”
declared during the announcement of the OMT programme as an
instrument to counter speculative attacks on certain euro-zone States’
public debt. So, the assessment in terms of proportionality made by
the Court with regards to a programme that does not have
quantitative but rather methodological limits takes on an importance
that goes beyond the specific case in question and can help to design
further instruments to be used by EU institutions as part of an
overhaul of the EMU.
It is of little importance if this discretionary action includes
“generally, the possibility of the ESCB purchasing from the creditors
of such a State, bonds previously issued by that State.” If this in fact
occurs with a series of “sufficient safeguards to ensure that the latter
does not fall foul of the prohibition of monetary financing in Article
123(1) TFEU,” this decision also appears legitimate.98
In the analysis of the Gauweiler judgement, a question, perhaps of
little real importance, does come to mind: did the Court want to
challenge the BVG, or at least a part of it, for having over-played
their role as defenders of German democracy? Certainly more
important, also for the European cause, is to view positively the
position the Court took with regards to the BVG, i.e. as a natural part
of the dialogue between courts and the essence of preliminary ruling
referrals. In this sense, if the obligations arising from EUmembership mean a community-oriented reading of certain
Grundgesetz rules, then this is simply how relations between national
97. Id. ¶ 88.
98. Id. ¶ 95.
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and EU laws normally work and is part and parcel of what jurists
have studied since Van Gend en Loos,99 which has also conditioned
the constitutional structure of all Member States, with the landmark
Frontini judgement of the Constitutional Court as an example from
Italy.100 Alas, as we shall see, the BVG did not entirely catch the
option offered by the ECJ.

B. THE BVG REPLY TO THE ECJ GAUWEILER JUDGMENT: NO
HAPPY END FOR THE EMU BUT RATHER AN ARMISTICE BETWEEN
COURTS
One year after the ECJ preliminary ruling judgment, the turn was
for the BVG to eventually close the complaints made by Mr.
Gauweiler et al. against the OMT programme: in June 2016 the BVG
judgment was rendered and it was an endorsement of the ECJ
position also from the German constitutional legal viewpoint.101
The BVG has in particular established that,
If the conditions formulated by the Court of Justice of the European
Union in its judgment of 16 June 2015 (C-62/14) and intended to limit the
scope of the OMT programme are met, the complainants’ rights . . . are
not violated by the fact that the Federal Government and the Bundestag
have not taken suitable steps to revoke or limit the effect of the policy
decision of the European Central Bank of 6 September 2012 concerning
the OMT programme. Furthermore, if these conditions are met, the OMT
programme does not currently impair the Bundestag’s overall budgetary
responsibility. If interpreted in accordance with the Court of Justice’s
judgment, the policy decision on the OMT programme does not
99. Case 26/62, Van Gend En Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen, 1963 E:C.R. 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=
CELEX:61962CJ0026; see Ingolf Pernice, The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order:
Fifty Years After Van Gend, in 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE JUDGMENT IN VAN
GEND EN LOOS: 1963-2013 55-57 (Antonio Tizzano et al. eds., 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/201312/qd30136442ac002.
pdf. (providing a reinterpretation of this judgment fifty years later).
100. Corte Cost., 18 dicembre 1973, n. 183, GIUR. IT. 1 (It.).
101. BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 2728/13, June 21, 2016,
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/06
/rs20160621_2bvr272813.html (Ger.); BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court],
Press Release No. 34/2016, Constitutional Complaints and Organstreit
Proceedings Against the OMT Programme of the European Central Bank
Unsuccessful, BVERFG (June 21, 2016), http://www.bundesverfassungs
gericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2016/bvg16-034.html [hereinafter
Press Release No. 34/2016].
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“manifestly” exceed the competences attributed to the European Central
Bank. Moreover, if interpreted in accordance with the Court of Justice’s
judgment, the OMT programme does not present a constitutionally
relevant threat to the German Bundestag’s right to decide on the
budget.102

This being the core of the judgment, by no way the endorsement
of the ECJ was unconditional nor enthusiastic.
In fact, the BVG was keen in restating its theory on the
constitutional limits to transfer powers to the EU and its institutions,
which is the prerequisite to allow EU law precedence of application
vis-à-vis national law, since
limits for the opening of German statehood derive from the constitutional
identity of the Basic Law . . . and from the European integration agenda,
which is laid down in the Act of Approval103 and vests European Union
law with the necessary democratic legitimacy for Germany.104

The BVG restated again the non-negotiable nature of the principles
of democracy and of people’s sovereignty established by the
Grundgesetz, which would be infringed “if institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies of the European Union that are not adequately
democratically legitimised through the European integration agenda
laid down in the Act of Approval exercise public authority.”105
It further stressed the role of German constitutional organs (among
them the BVG) to protect and promote the citizens’ rights, if the
citizens are not themselves able to ensure the integrity of their rights.
According to the BVG, this is exactly the case as regards the OMT
programme, or any other measure adopted by EU institutions
affecting the German budget. When exercising their constitutional
right as voters and thus implementing their “right to democracy,”
German citizens acquire as well the right to be protected by German
constitutional organs “to ensure that the drop in influence
(Einflussknick) . . . that come with the implementation of the
102. Id.
103. Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem
Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union [Law of Cooperation of
the Federal Government and German Parliament Concerning the European Union],
March 12, 1993 (BGBl. I, 311) (Ger.).
104. Press Release No. 34/2016, supra note 101.
105. Id.
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European integration agenda do not extend further than is justified by
the transfer of sovereign powers to the European Union.”106
These being the premises to the BVG reasoning on the merits of
the OMT programme, the German Court then passed on evaluating
the ECJ judgment: in essence, rather then accepting the conclusions
offered by the ECJ, thus closing the matter once and forever, the
BVG decided to maintain its confrontational approach.
On the one hand, it acknowledged that the ECJ has set some
“framework conditions” in analysing the OMT programme, and
attached to these conditions the reasons why they have been
legitimised by the ECJ.107 On the other hand, however, it raised
“serious objections” to the analysis made by the ECJ on “the way the
facts of the case were established, the way the principle of conferral
was discussed, and the way the judicial review of acts of the
European Central Bank that relate to the definition of its mandate
was conducted.”108
This stated, since the judicial review concerning the OMT
programme was essentially to measure whether the ECB had acted
ultra vires, and since the ascertaining of an act to be ultra vires
requires – irrespective of the area concerned – that it “manifestly
exceeds the competences transferred to the European Union,” the
alleged mistakes committed by the ECJ appeared to be, in the end,
“acceptable because on the level of the exercise of competences the
Court of Justice had essentially performed the restrictive
interpretation of the policy decision that the [BVG’s] request for a
preliminary ruling . . . held to be possible.”109
106. Id.
107. See Constitutional Complaints and Organstreit Proceedings Against the
OMT Programme of the European Central Bank Unsuccessful, GERMAN LAW
ARCHIVE (June 22, 2016), http://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=1223
[hereinafter German OMT Case] (articulating that the Court of Justice bases its
view to a large extent on the objectives of the OMT programme, on the means
employed to achieve those objectives, and on the programme’s effects on
economic policy, which, according to the Court of Justice, are only indirect in
nature, and explaining that that this review is based not only on the policy decision
of 6 September 2012 concerning the technical details, but derives further
framework conditions from the principle of proportionality which set binding
limits for any implementation of the OMT programme).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Yet, in order to guarantee that the ‘framework conditions’ defined
by the ECJ continue to be met, without allowing that the OMT
programme actually turns into an ultra vires act, the BVG concluded
that “the German Bundesbank – i.e. one of the members of the ESCB
– may only participate in the programme’s implementation if and to
the extent that the prerequisites defined by the Court of Justice are
met;” and this can take place only if six conditions hold true, which
were listed in detail by the BVG.110
Thus, like in the request for preliminary ruling, in which questions
were posed assertively and rhetorically,111 the BVG did not abandon
its intent to address the ECJ with its specific point of view on the
interpretation to be given to the relevant rules and powers governing
the EMU and the functioning of its institutions. Indeed, the BVG
expressly admits it cannot challenge the legality of acts adopted by
the ECB (being the ECB a EU institution, which cannot be subject to
any scrutiny by Member States’ courts, even of constitutional
nature); and yet, through the conditioning imposed to the
Bundesbank, i.e. the German Central Bank, which is a member of the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the will to condition the
implementation of the EU monetary policy is evident.112
Thus, the BVG does not seem to have been sensitive to the signals
of uneasiness that, in its Gauweiler judgment, the ECJ had
manifested in respect both of the stance adopted by the BVG in its
110. See id. (pointing out that, per the BVG, this is particularly the case when (i)
purchases are not announced, (ii) the volume of the purchases is limited from the
outset, (iii) there is a minimum period between the issue of the government bonds
and their purchase by the ESCB that is defined from the outset and prevents the
issuing conditions from being distorted, (iv) the ESCB purchases only government
bonds of Member States that have bond market access enabling the funding of such
bonds, (v) purchased bonds are only in exceptional cases held until maturity and
(vi) purchases are restricted or ceased and purchased bonds are remarketed should
continuing the intervention become unnecessary).
111. See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag ¶ 16 (June 16, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-62/14&language=EN (asserting that,
per the settled case law of the Court, a preliminary ruling is binding on the national
court, as regards the interpretation or the validity of the acts of the EU institutions
in question).
112. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 282.1, March 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter T.F.E.U.] (establishing, pursuant to art. 282.1,
the ECB, together with national central banks of Member States, conduct the
monetary policy of the Union).
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request for preliminary ruling, and of the didactic “response” it had
clearly tried to give to all (national courts included, first of all the
BVG), in particular as regards the opportunity of a strong judicial
restraint in the assessment of the contents and of the boundaries of
very technical matters such as the monetary policy transmission
mechanisms, like the OMT programme, for whose implementation
other institutions are competent.
On the contrary, the BVG stretched (apparent) domestic
constitutional constraints with the intent to accommodate the
monetary policy of the Union. And it did so in a way that does not
seem persuasive under different viewpoints: in the first place,
because of the explicit criticism the BVG formulates on the contents
of the ECJ judgment. Considering the importance of the two courts,
and of the systemic effects their case-law has on the entire EU legal
sphere, such a resentful reply could and honestly should be avoided.
Secondly, and above all, the six detailed conditions113 which the
BVG considers mandatory for an implementation of the OMT
programme consistent with the intent to avoid ultra vires acts by the
ECB, in my view go beyond the role of the judiciary in monetary
matters. Moreover, they are capable of creating undesirable tensions
in the very delicate inter-institutional equilibrium characterizing the
EMU and, in fact, the EU. To be honest, in this historic moment of
crisis of the Union, no real need is felt for further disturbances to its
overall credibility and to the accountability of the acts adopted – or
to be adopted – by its institutions. Thirdly, and from a pure legal
point of view, the suspicion remains that the BVG continues to be in
breach of the duty of sincere cooperation established by article 4.3
TEU.114
Wisely enough, the “political” outcome of the BVG judgment was
that it legitimised the OMT programme, without much attention
being paid to the caveats and warnings contained in the BVG
reasoning. And as far as my knowledge goes, even more wisely has
the ECB totally ignored – at least in official communications – the
113. See id. (enumerating the six criteria under which the Bundesbank may
participate in the OMT program, in accordance with the reality that the program
constitutes an ultra vires act).
114. See supra Part II(B) (elaborating on the Conditionality Principle and issues
that arise regarding the coordination of economic policy between Member States).
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BVG judgment.
This said, the turbulent legal conditions characterizing the EMU
become rather evident if one considers that (i) the OMT programme
has not been implemented yet (and at this stage might never be
implemented), but was simply announced by the ECB some four
years ago, (ii) this announcement has been done with a press release,
and the ECB never produced a structured legal document to describe
terms and conditions under which the OMT programme would be
implemented, and (iii) this press release has given both the ECJ and
the BVG the opportunity to display rather different views on
paramount legal issues concerning the EMU.

VI. CONCLUSIONS
Apart from the political aspects, from the legal viewpoint the
obvious shortcomings of rules concerning the EMU and financial
assistance to States that I have described represent a threat to the
overall stability of the European system.
Some, optimistically, characterise the current phase of European
integration as being “semi-intergovernmental” in method.115
However, the effect at a technical-juridical level determined by
positions taken by national supreme courts is evident. In fact these
courts, working from the perspective of their own domestic legal
systems, limit room for political negotiation or to in anyway uphold
constitutional values (no longer common) in the name of
safeguarding the interpretation and application of EU or ESM rules.
This situation of political but also legal uncertainty may enhance
the occurrence of further serious systemic risks, even though
European institutions and Member States have managed, some more
than others, to stave off the danger and avert the disintegration of the
European legal system.
It is true that recent important works by scholars have sought to go
beyond a mere reassessment of the constitutional system of the EU
115. See generally Koen Lenaerts, EMU and the European Union Constitutional
Framework, 39 EUR. L. REV. 753, 756 (2014) (noting that EU institutions have
adopted a series of measures aimed at preventing future financial crises and that
reinforcing intergovernmental cooperation has been deployed with an aim to
reinforce fiscal discipline).
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and EMU;116 it is also true that over the last few years legal studies
on economic and monetary union have occupied considerable space
in specialised journals after years of relative disinterest.117
Given the present impracticality of further ‘constitutional’ reforms
at EU level (for many of which also prior constitutional reforms at
Member States’ level might be necessary), it is, nevertheless, worth
pointing out those legislative initiatives aimed at formally linking the
EMU and ESM systems, such as Regulation 472/2013, which
establishes the conditions to be complied with by Member States in
serious financial difficulties or which have applied for financial
assistance.118 Interestingly, and a fact not missed by the doctrine,119
116. See id. at 753 (noting that the EMU has undergone a “dramatic overhaul”
affecting the EU’s constitutional framework, and noting further that in order to
avoid future financial crises the EMU must be grounded in the principles of
financial solidarity and fiscal authority); see also Edoardo Chiti & Pedro Gustavo
Teixeira, The Constitutional Implications of the European Responses to the
Financial and Public Debt Crisis, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 697 (2013) (noting
that the ESM is a “properly constitutional mechanism” but that its legal status and
fundamental rules may be unable to meet the challenges because of the lack of any
accountability tools available in the structure of EU agencies); cf. Jonathan
Tomkin, Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact of
the Adoption of the ESM Treaty on the State of European Democracy, 14 GERMAN
L.J. 185 (2013) (asserting that the Union’s response to the euro-crisis has
significantly altered the Constitutional balance upon which the Union’s stability is
premised); Miguel Poiares Maduro et al., The Democratic Governance of the Euro,
Glob. Governance Programme (May 20, 2012), http://globalgovernance
programme.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Policy-Report10May20121.pdf
(explaining that one of the consequences in democratic terms for the Union was the
rejection of the constitutionalization of the Stability Pact); Leszek Balcerowicz et
al., Governance for the Eurozone: Integration or Disintegration?, EUR. UNIV.
INST. (2012), http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/FIC/FICPress/goveuro.pdf (emphas
-izing an element of learning from the Dutch Referendum and suggesting that
opposition to European authoritarianism is alive and well); see generally Päivi
Leino & Janne Salminen, Should the Economic and Monetary Union Be
Democratic after All? Some Reflections on the Current Crisis, 14 GERMAN L.J.
853 (2013) (pointing out that while the constitutional rearrangement that took its
final form in the Treaty of Lisbon provided for opportunities for the rewriting of
various Treaty provisions, no amendments were made to the fundamental
asymmetry that is characteristic of the EMU).
117. See supra Part II(A).
118. See Council Regulation 472/2013, art. 1, 2013 O.J. (L 140) 1, 3 (EU)
(laying out provisions for strengthening the economic and budgetary surveillance
of Member States that utilize the Euro as their currency).
119. See Lenaerts, supra note 115, at 757 (explaining that under the ESM Treaty
and in accordance and compatibility with EU law, financial assistance is subject to
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the economic adjustment programmes (the so-called Memoranda of
Understanding) signed by Member States’ asking for financial
assistance subject to conditionality, are applied by the Council, the
Commission and Member States, which ‘shall take into account
national rules and practice and Article 28 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.’120 The reason why
reference is made only to the social rights contained in the Charter,
i.e. article 28, is not fully clear unless in the sense of referring
exclusively to acts (e.g. MOUs) still considered outside the EU
system and so not subject to article 51 of the Charter.
In regard to the Court of Justice, Gauweiler represents a major
step forward after Pringle, despite the fact that some questions
remain unanswered, and notwithstanding the piqued endorsement it
received by the BVG. The danger of not implementing real
mechanisms of financial assistance for Member States has been
averted. Judgements, like Pringle, I would define as emergency
decisions that raise doubts and generate conflicts in the system which
need to be resolved by normative reforms. If these reforms are not
forthcoming, the Court risks becoming an institution that is more
political than it should be, with critical effects on the entire EU legal
system.
With this in mind, the Gauweiler judgement offers up one final
point that deserves attention. This can be found in the part already
referred to that establishes the jurisdictional limits to the Court’s
review of the ESBC’s activities: the recognition of these limits with
regards to the activities of highly technical institutions like the
ESBC, ECB and, in the future, also other bodies and agencies
charged with managing the euro-zone, is consistent with an
increasingly complex legal environment121. This situation is yet
three cumulative conditions).
120. Council Regulation 472/2013, art. 1 (providing also that “the application of
this Regulation and of those recommendations does not affect the right to
negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements or to take collective action
in accordance with national law”).
121. When this article was in its revision and printing phase, further judgments
have been adopted by the Court of Justice dealing with (a) the effects of ESM
decisions and policies onto individual rights, and (b) the obligations of EU
institutions, even when acting outside the scope of the TFEU and TEU as “agents”
within the ESM. In particular, the court affirmed that (i) when adopting a decision
as agent for the ESM, the Commission nevertheless retains its role of “custodian”
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another example of the distance between citizens’ political
representatives, the rules adopted where these representatives sit, and
the “government choices,” which I have attempted to show are
certainly not limited to the economy or the currency.
The constitutional consequences in the history of European
integration appear episodic, driven by different contingencies and
without the attention and legitimisation, also democratic, that should
instead be fundamental.
Not by chance, some proposals for euro-zone reforms doing the
political rounds put forward the idea of a parliamentary institution
made up by euro-zone representatives with specific and more
effective powers than they have at present on the issue of reform.122
In this perspective, also the quest by the BVG for a more active role
of the democracy principle within the EU paramount choices should
of the EU treaties as established by TEU Article 17; (ii) the EU institutions are
bound by Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU even when
they act outside the scope of the EU treaties (i.e. the duty to “respect the rights,
observe the principles and promote the application [of the Charter] in accordance
with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union
as conferred on it in the Treaties”); and consequently (iii) breach of the above
obligations exposes the EU institutions (and member states in their jurisdictions) to
liability rules vis-à-vis the individual, and hence to the duty to reimburse any
damage resulting to them under the conditions laid down by TFEU Article 340,
second and third paragraphs (see joined cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P, Ledra
Advertising and others v. Commission and European Central Bank, 2016 E.C.R.
701, ¶ 59-69). As I have argued elsewhere (see Francesco Munari, La Corte di
giustizia e i nuovi soggetti istituiti nel quadro dell’unione economica e monetaria,
IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUR., (2018), ; the manuscript is on file by the author),
this decision is criticisable: the right of individuals to claim for damages, albeit
theoretically affirmed, seems de facto generally not available to anybody, because
of the strict conditions established at EU level to trigger the EU institutions’
responsibility in cases like those concerning the conditions established by the ESM
to grant financial assistance in favour of member states. This is clear both in the
Ledra Advertising case and in parallel cases meanwhile decided by the Court, such
as C‐526/14, Tadej Kotnik e a. v. Državni zbor Republike Slovenije, E.C.R. 2016,
570, ¶ 50 and C-41/15, Gerald Dowling and others v. Minister for Finance, 2016
E.C.R. 836, in particular ¶ 48.
122. See generally Justin Huggler, French Economy Minister Calls for Full
Fiscal
Union
in
Eurozone,
TELEGRAPH
(Aug.
31,
2015),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11835614/Frencheconomyminister
callsforfullfiscalunionineurozone.html (quoting the French Minister for the
Economy Emmanuel Macron, calling for the Commissioner to be given new
authority, and proposing that a new economic government should be held to
account by a new “Euro Parliament”).
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not go totally unnoticed among European leaders, for it might
eventually reduce the distances between the “German” and the
“Luxembourgian” reading of the EMU.

